American Ground 
      Transport*      By 1949, General Motors had 
      been involved in the replacement of more than 100 electric transit systems 
      with GM buses in 45 cities including New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
      St. Louis, Oakland, Salt Lake City, and Los Angeles. In April of that 
      year, a Chicago Federal jury convicted GM of having criminally conspired 
      with Standard Oil of California, Firestone Tire and others to replace 
      electric transportation with gas- or diesel-powered buses and to 
      monopolize the sale of buses and related products to local transportation 
      companies throughout the country. The court imposed a sanction of $5,000 
      on GM. In addition, the jury convicted H.C. Grossman, who was then 
      treasurer of General Motors. Grossman had played a key role in the 
      motorization campaigns and had served as a director of Pacific City Lines 
      when that company undertook the dismantlement of the $100 million Pacific 
      Electric system. The court fined Grossman the magnanimous sum of 
      $1.  Copyright © 1974 by Third Rail Press, © 1999 by The Composing Stack 
      Inc. *Quotations in this article are taken from AMERICAN GROUND TRANSPORT, 
      A Proposal for Restructuring the Automobile, Truck, Bus, and Rail 
      Industries, © 1973 by Bradford C. Snell. Excerpts used by permission of 
      the author The Third Rail and The Third Rail 
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     Despite its criminal conviction, 
      General Motors continued to acquire and dieselize electric transit 
      properties through September of 1955. By then, approximately 88 percent of 
      the nations electric streetcar network had been eliminated. In 1936, when 
      GM organized National City Lines, 40,000 streetcars were operating in the 
      United States; at the end of 1965, only 5,000 remained. In December of 
      that year, GM bus chief Roger M. Kyes correctly observed: The motor coach 
      has supplanted the interurban systems and has for all practical purposes 
      eliminated the trolley (street-car) . . . 
     
      Electric street railways and electric trolley buses were eliminated 
      without regard to their relative merit as a mode of transport. Their 
      displacement by oil-powered buses maximized the earnings of GM 
      stockholders; but it deprived the riding public of a competing method of 
      travel, the report asserts, and quotes urban transit expert George M. 
      Smerk as saying that " Street railways and trolley bus operations, even 
      if better suited to traffic needs and the public interest, were doomed in 
      favor of the vehicles and material produced by the conspirators. 
      " 
     Progressing from the conversion of 
      rail systems to bus transportation, new market temptations appear on the 
      transportation scene: 
     General Motors 
      gross revenues are 10 times greater if it sells cars rather than buses. In 
      theory, therefore, GM has every economic incentive to discourage bus 
      ridership. In fact, its bus dieselization program may have generated that 
      effect. Engineering studies strongly suggest that conversion from electric 
      transit to diesel buses results in higher operating costs, loss of 
      patronage, and eventual bankruptcy. They demonstrate, for example, that 
      diesel buses have 28 percent shorter economic lives, 40 percent higher 
      operating costs, and 9 percent lower productivity than electric buses. 
      They also conclude that the diesels foul smoke, ear-splitting noise, and 
      slow acceleration may discourage ridership. In short, by increasing the 
      costs, reducing the revenues, and contributing to the collapse of hundreds 
      of transit systems, GMs dieselization program may have had the long-term 
      effect of selling GM cars. 
     But the last 
      chapter of mass transit history has not been written and the Snell report 
      views the present and anticipates the future as it looks at the political 
      restraint of rail transit by the continuing efforts of auto makers. [The 
      auto industry] has used [its revenues from auto sales] to finance 
      political activities which, in the absence of effective countervailing 
      activities by competing ground transport industries, induced government 
      bodies to promote their product (automobiles) over other alternatives, 
      particularly rail rapid transit. 
     "On 
      June 28, 1932, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., president of 
      General Motors, organized the National Highway Users Conference [whose] announced objectives 
      were dedication of highway taxes solely to highway purposes, 
      and development of a continuing program of highway construction. 
Reprinted by permission. Not responsible for typographical 
      errors.
     
       
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